The Rise of a New Russia: How Long “Independent Moldova” Can Survive?

The Rise of a New Russia: How Long “Independent Moldova” Can Survive?

Overview

In a postmodern era the system of international relations is being shaken deep down to its foundations by the rise of an old-new actor eager to regain the power lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian Federation, its heir, tries to bring the established international order down to pieces returning to the era of bipolarism and realpolitik.

The events in Georgia, a sovereign state facing two “frozen conflicts” on its territory, the legacy left by the defunct Soviet Union, have triggered a brutal and unconceivable reaction from Russia, who started a full-fledged war against Georgia hiding behind week excuses of protecting Russian citizens in South Osetia. South Osetia, a breakaway region of Georgia who enjoys de facto independence since 1991 and de jure being under Russian control served as motive for Georgian authorities to start military actions after continuous provocations from the unrecognized regime in Tshinval, the capital of South Osetia. Russian Federation retaliated as if Russian territory was attacked leading to an occupation of half Georgian territory, including key points as the town of Gori, military port to the Black Sea, Poti and military base in Senaki, all controlled by Russian troops even now when a six points cease-fire agreement was reached by EU mediation calling for a full withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgia.

The reaction of international community was humble, to say the few. Both the US and the EU condemned Russian aggression in Georgia, but did nothing to stop it. Verbal warnings had no effect portraying a Russia who continued to argue it was a righteous action and the blame belongs to Tbilisi.

The apogees nevertheless, was the Russian recognition of South Osetian and Abkhazian independence, which gives a new dangerous “perspective” over the resolution of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Following these events, Moldova should deeply reconsider its position towards Russia and the instruments used by Moscow in Georgia. While such a scenario has little chances to be repeated in Transnistria, precautionary steps and a new strategy have to be formulated in order to avoid a worsening of the situation in the Transnistrian conflict resolution process.

Moldova’s Non-reaction Equals to Silence of the Lambs

Moldova and Georgia have a lot in common. They have been parts of the Soviet Union and after its disintegration they inherited separatist movements on their newly established territories. Both of them had a common actor to blame for that: Russia. After 2003 when Voronin turned down Kozak Memorandum and announced European integration as priority number one of Moldovan foreign policy, Moldova and Georgia got closer within a new regional organization, GUAM, featuring Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, all united by a sense of opposition to Russian policies in the Commonwealth of Independent States and explicit will to join the European Union.

Unfortunately, since 2005 Voronin and his Communist rule abandoned the allies within GUAM building on a closer and privileged relation with Russia. Heavily betting on the Russian support to find a solution to the Transnistrian conflict, Chisinau got blind to all the other matters in the post-Soviet space. Now, with the Russian-Georgian war unfolded, Moldova remained silent. The only thing to do was a communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration by which Moldova aligned itself to the EU declaration on the matter. No other official declarations on behalf of the Presidency or Parliament have followed. Compared to Ukraine’s president Yushchenko who blamed Russian aggression, closed Ukrainian ports for the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and sent humanitarian aid to Georgia, Voronin was having his vacation in Croatia. In his absence, no other official expressed any position towards the outrageous actions of Russia. Just recently, after the civil society and a group of experts expressed deep concerns about the developments taking place in the region, the Government shamefully released a declaration by which declares that the conflict on Georgia will have no repercussions for Moldova and the resolution of Transnistrian problem. Even more, the Government considers there are good preconditions that will allow the parties to successfully bring the matter to a quick end.

This conviction obviously stems from the visit Voronin paid to Sochi where he met with Russian president Medvedev. Apparently, Medvedev warned Voronin not to repeat Georgian “mistakes” and declared that a peaceful solution can be found if to respect the actual format of negotiations and the commitments Moldova engaged to. Hence, one should think that Voronin pledged not to undertake any military action, which anyway would have been futile given the superior armed forces Tiraspol has at its disposal, but instead promised to stay quiet, follow Moscow’s indications and everyone will be happy. This however means a return to Kozak plan rejected in 2003 by Voronin, if to cite Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, a situation highly unacceptable to official Chisinau. President Voronin was speaking after the meeting with Medvedev that Russia supports Moldovan territorial integrity and will go in accordance with the Moldovan Parliament’s law from 2005. In this context it is difficult to discern where the truth lies. Nevertheless, given the fact Russia feels stronger than ever it will do the things its own way, either peacefully or militarily.

However Moldova’s position is strikingly naïve and optimistic about its “independence” celebrated recently. Notwithstanding the regretful events happening in the Caucasus, Moldova’s authorities still believe Russia will act within the provisions of the international law and will respect Moldova’s territorial integrity, not mentioning the fact it has military forces deployed in Transnistria and no words were mentioned about this at the meeting in Sochi.

Moreover, the quick visit of Romanian president Basescu to Chisinau in the framework of his Black Sea tour to discuss the security matters in the aftermath of Russian aggression in Georgia did not bring the expected results. The experts consider that Basescu acted on the suggestion of EU and the US and had to rally support in order to prevent future possible developments of Russia’s actions in its neighborhood. Most probably Voronin was advised to think over his position towards Russia and not to provoke the authorities in Tiraspol. This comes after Smirnov regime condemned Georgian actions in South Osetia and demanded that Chisinau does the same. Furthermore, Tiraspol interrupted any liaisons with Chisinau until the authorities on the left bank will adopt a clear anti-Georgia position. Following these developments it is hardly conceivable how both Russia and official Chisinau speak about the resolution process in such positive terms. Moreover, after Kremlin recognized South Osetia and Abkhazia independence, Tiraspol expects the same treatment. Voices in the political circles on the right bank declared that same scenario will develop in Tiraspol as well, no matter the official position in Chisinau.

It becomes more and more complicated since only the civil society got alarmed. The authorities continue to put their trust in Russia ignoring the voice of reason. Civil society limited in its actions and with the opposition totally ignored too, the Communists will take full responsibility for everything which might happen.

As in the past, Voronin favors to solve foreign policy issues directly with Russia and not to rely on the West. Now it is high time to question once again the military neutrality of Moldova, the commitments taken towards European partners as well as the allegiances to Moscow. Is Kremlin closer and better than Brussels?

What Comes Next?

In the last weeks Georgia held the frontlines in all major newspapers all over the world. As a side effect, the situation in Moldova was discussed as well depicting different scenarios for Transnistria. These scenarios are closely linked to the future of Ukraine, given the sharp reactions of Yushchenko administration to Russia’s actions in Georgia. The explanation is the demographic structure of Crimea and its strategic importance in the Black Sea for Russia where its fleet is hosted. The majority of the Crimea population is of Russian nationality which holds Russian passports. A possible intention to join Russia and a disintegration of Ukraine, which is taken into consideration by the West as a follow-up to Georgia, could trigger even more dangerous developments in Transnistria.

One scenario would stand for an independent Crimea asking to be included into the Russian Federation. In this case Russia would prefer to link Crimea to Transnistria as a bridge to the Balkans as it always wanted. With disappearance of Ukraine as a state, other territorial claims would be submitted by other neighbors. One would be Romania to claim the northern part of Bucovina and Hertsa region as well as Southern Bessarabia with Ismail and Belgorod regions. Another claimant would be Poland to include all western Ukraine, eastern part leaning to Russia. In this case the solution for the rest of Moldova, favored by the West would be to unite with Romania. This is the most “fantastic” development which the EU and the US should not let happen.

Another scenario is that Russia will impose to Moldova a Kozak II plan given its rise and a policy based on force. With Georgia scenario in mind, Voronin will have to capitulate and accept a federal solution. This will mean a Transnistrization of the whole Moldova, an already ongoing process as a consequence of the submissive policy promoted by Communist party. Hence, Moldova will become a puppet state ruled from Moscow. So far this scenario has the biggest chances to materialize, since the authorities seem not to be worried and ahead of the elections next year they can accept a quick solution to the conflict. If the EU and the US will not intervene in case the situation degenerates in such a way, as they did in 2003, Moldova might be lost.

The third scenario and the most desired one would be the replacement of Russian peacekeeper contingent with a mission of military and civil observers deployed by the EU under the mandate of UN. This should be followed by the total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria and all the stockpiles of ammunition. The negotiation format should exclude Russia as a party to the conflict and to include the EU and the US as mediators. Only this can bring a fair solution to the conflict and preserve territorial integrity of Moldova. This third scenario is totally impossible under the Communist government. If Moldova resists any Russian solution at least till the elections, one can hope that Moldovan electorate will punish the current party and vote for a change. A pro-Western government can advocate the above mentioned scenario which responds to the national interests of the state.

Prognosis

Russian aggression towards Georgia changed the way frozen conflicts are solved on the post-Soviet space. With the unilateral recognition of South Osetia and Abkhazia independence by the Russian Federation, the things will get more precipitated in Transnistria and possibly in Nagorno-Karabakh. The somehow hesitant position of the EU and its internal division leaves Russia with a free hand and the possibility to get away with it. While Germany, Italy, France showed a conciliating attitude, the new EU members called for action against the eastern giant. An emergency EU-Russia summit was scheduled to be held on September 1 approaching the situation in Georgia. Little can spring out of this event if the EU will not push for measures aiming to discipline Russia.

On its side, Moldova and its government have to keep the eyes wide open and not to step into Russia’s trap with regard to Transnistrian settlement. Despite the huge desire to solve the issue before the elections, the Communist party has to think first of all about the long-term national interests of the state and not short-term gains before the electoral cycle. Now since Russia is showing a huge appetite for restoring its complete influence in the “near abroad”, this appetite has to be contained by the EU, as it is the Union who may follow.

Russia’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Moldova: Building on the Momentum for the Interests of “Greater Russia”

Russia’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Moldova: Building on the Momentum for the Interests of “Greater Russia”

Overview

For the first time since 2003 a high Transnistrian official could travel to Europe to spread the word about the wishes of the “Transnistrian people” and its rightful quest for independence. On the other hand Russia is pushing forward a “unique” model of conflict resolution for the post-soviet space which from Moscow’s point of view will end the territorial disputes and will bring peace and prosperity under the kind leadership of Russia.

The visit of the Russian Duma’s speaker to Chisinau could be considered a new step in the scheme designed to make the reunification of Moldova possible under the Russian auspices whatever it may hold. As Communist party led by Voronin is approaching a critical moment to face the elections next year, the goal of reuniting the country appears to be paramount in boosting the party’s popularity. The conditions under which this reunification has to take place are fully disregarded by the current leadership, Voronin submitting entirely Moldova’s future to Russian interests.

However, a new Commission for European Integration has been created by a President decree to witness speaker Marian Lupu left outside alone, while Polish and Swedish governments are backing an “Eastern Partnership” to include the neighboring Eastern countries and develop closer relationships with the EU.

Russia’s Emerging Power of Conflict Resolution

Kosovo precedent made Russia look differently at the frozen conflicts in the post-soviet space and Russian leadership saw a possibility to avenge itself in the relation with the West. That would consist in Russia emerging as a key actor in solving these conflicts to its benefit and at the expense of the other actors concerned, primarily the EU. As such, Moldova is the best opportunity ever to accomplish this far-reaching goal. A successful reunification of Moldova under Russia’s auspices will give it the right to claim first-hand actions on the post-soviet space as well as elsewhere where Russian interests are affected. Since the EU and Russia dispute between themselves the influence in countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, etc this “fight” for spheres of interest becomes fiercer and fiercer. Nonetheless, Russia holds the advantage of having tied these countries to its economy and controlling them through energy supplies which are vital for all of these states.

Why Moldova is fit for serving Russian interests? First of all, through its supportive policy towards Tiraspol, Russia estranged Chisinau and threw it in the arms of the West, who however did not take advantage from it at the right time. Now the situation changed and as Moldova intensified its relations with the EU, Russia became more aware of the fact that it may lose its influence in the region. Moreover, NATO enlargement and the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining it triggered a more active involvement on behalf of Russia towards resolution process in Moldova. Yet, this involvement has its cost which must be paid by Voronin.

The terms for reaching a final political settlement have been made clear by Russia – Moldova has to make its neutrality an internationally recognized matter in such a way cutting any possibility for Moldova to join NATO. Second, the reunification has to ensure and recognize Russian investments in Transnistria illegally carried out together with Tiraspol leadership. Thus, the strategic branches of Moldovan economy will be controlled by Russian business – wine and spirits sector, steel industry, energy sector. Third, Russia insists on a fair representation of Transnistria in the future political institutions of the reunited state. It would not matter the formula used for the new state – unitary, federation or anything else if Transnistrian politicians gained access to key positions in the government. The political analysts even coined a term for this “grand project” – Transnistrization. In some way, this is exactly what will happen if the settlement is to follow the Russian plan.

The application of this ostentatious project has actually already begun. First, Voronin met with Smirnov and it was made possible only by Russian interference. Furthermore, negotiations in the “5+2” format are strongly backed to be resumed and Russia is exerting pressure on Tiraspol to come back to the negotiations table. Third, Russia undertakes steps on strengthening the link with Moldovan parliament, as the most constitutionally important institution of the country and which will have to play a key role in the event of reunification. Thus, Mironov, the Russian speaker visited Chisinau and Comrat and publicly avoided to pay a visit to Tiraspol. This is a sign for Smirnov that he has to go into concessions with Chisinau - otherwise Moscow’s support will seize to exist for him.

Accordingly, Voronin has to pay back what Russia does for him. The new Concept of National Security has been adopted against the fierce disagreement of the Opposition. This new concept fails to account for Moldova’s interests and actually puts at risk its security with the Russian troops still present on its territory. Furthermore, Voronin voiced the intention of possibly leaving GUAM as an anti-Russian organization. Also the relations with Bucharest are worsening again, fed by disagreements over Border Agreement, etc. In such a way, Moldova finds itself at Russian mercy which will not hesitate to take full advantage of it. The only hope is that the Opposition from Parliament, civil society as well as the EU will take a more active stance to preclude Communists from making Moldova a gift to Moscow and resuscitate the dream of a “Greater Russia”. With such a growing appetite, there is not too far the time when not Moldova will be at stake. That is why these “expansionist” ambitions and search for power have to be tempered now when it is not too late, while Moldova shall become a reintegrated state under the auspices of the international community, in accordance with the international law and the will expressed by its people.

The Nature of the Beast: Economic Prowess – Political Clumsiness

Since its inception the European Union, the then three European Communities wanted itself to be no more than an economic organization in order to rebuild Europe after the devastation of the Second World War as well as to put an end to the Franco-German hostility. As such it never was meant to go beyond this boundary and to merge into a political entity as to have “a Europe speaking with a single voice”. Undoubtedly, the progress made over decades deserves to be called a good try. Yet, Europe is as far from being a heavy political actor as it was 50 years ago. Hence, the best quotation for this “ambitious integration project” remains to be “EU – an economic giant and a political dwarf”.

Apart from all the examples in the past to illustrate this postulate like the Balkan wars, disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the war in Iraq, the most recent would be Moldova. Why so? Moldova never was of interest to EU. However, the situation changed when the enlargement wave included Romania and the “black hole of Europe” became a problem to worry about. Secessionist region of Transnistria was no longer a concern only for Moldova. Nonetheless, the other major threat springing from the poorest country in Europe was the illegal migration which EU is unable to fight efficiently. As a result, Moldova found itself between “two fires” – Moscow and Brussels.

While economic attractiveness of EU has no match, Moldova is tied up historically to the Russian market, plus a heavy political influence exerted by Russian government over Moldovan political class. Given the frozen conflict which both objectively and subjectively hinders the development of the country, the battle over Moldova would be won by the one who manages to solve the conflict. Still, this is the simplest way of looking at things, in reality the situation being a lot more complex.

As mentioned above, Russia is developing a model of conflict resolution and Moldova is the experimental ground for it. On the other hand EU has its own model of conflict resolution – the Europeanization understood in terms of conditionality and socialization into European norms and values with a gradual integration with EU structures at a certain level the highest one being the actual joining of the Union. In this case Moldova could also be an experimental ground for EU to test its ability as a political actor and conflict resolution.

Accordingly, several steps have been made. One of them was the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. The Mission renders good results, however no weaponry or big quantity of drugs have been discovered as it was expected at the beginning. In the same vein, the Mission is one of assistance and advisory with a limited mandate and no political power. The possibility for a Mission of Military and Civil Observers with an international mandate sent under the auspices of EU in tandem with UN in Transnistria to replace the Russian “peacekeepers” went unanswered. Maximum what EU was ready to do is to accept the observer status within the negotiation format “5+2” and earlier in 2005 to appoint a Special Representative for Moldova. Frankly speaking, all these initiatives proved futile and of little impact. None of these could counter Russian power in the region and as in the past Moscow gains more and more ground.

The recent trip of Transnistrian speaker to Europe was a breakthrough, but not for the conflict resolution process, but for Transnistria’s fight against isolation. All Sevciuk did was to let Europe know about the desire for independence of Transnistrian people. Any agreement for political settlement with Chisinau has to respect that will. The other meetings Sevciuk had in Brussels with EU officials and Moldovan speaker Lupu also rendered few results. Until the parties do not sit at the negotiations table to reach an agreement the situation will go unchanged. And that is specifically what Russia is trying to do – to bring the parties to speak to each other, but following the directives from Moscow. In this scenario the losers are Chisinau and Brussels. While this can have a small impact on EU now, in the long run the Union will have to face directly Russian strength along the whole eastern border. Instead Moldova will seize to exist as an independent and sovereign state, which it never actually was. A reunified Moldova under Russian guidelines will be a puppet state entirely controlled from Moscow. To wait until the 2009 elections can prove to be somewhat late. If the EU is to do something and disprove its fame of a political dwarf, it has to do it here and now.

Eastern Partnership: A New Tool to Keep Away Undesirables?

Recently the Polish and Swedish governments have come up with a new initiative to improve the effectiveness of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). That is to be called the Eastern Partnership (EP) and will include Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the possible inclusion of Belarus and Russia. The initiative in itself bears nothing new, as it replicates to some extent the Mediterranean Partnership. The declarative goals of this undertaking are a visa-free regime, free trade area, enhanced political ties. All in all, a beneficial policy for all the partners involved – EU-27 and target countries.

Nevertheless, the EP will not have a separate secretariat and will be administered directly by the Commission. Moreover, there is still lacking a full support among the member states for the initiative to be launched. And at the end of the day, the project lacks its finality. What should this EP accomplish? Membership to the EU is off the agenda for all target countries, no mentioning of an associate status either. It seems that the EP has finality just for EU – to keep away the undesirables. On the one hand it is clear that absorption capacity of EU decreased after encompassing ten new states during 2004-2007, following in the near future another wave of enlargement to bring in the Western Balkans. Yet, a clear-cut prospective for the eastern neighbors will only enhance their willingness to change and internalize European norms and values.

Poland always backed Ukrainian interests within EU advocating for its inclusion. Same policy it displays towards Moldova. To a certain degree the new members will possibly support a European future for Moldova and Ukraine. What is unclear is the behavior of old members who are the biggest contributors to EU budget. Most likely a more distant approach would be the answer. Another drawback of the EP is its extension to Russia. Given the tacit war between the EU and Russia for control in this buffer zone, the latter will do anything to prevent Moldova and Ukraine as well as Georgia from developing closer ties with the EU. As long as there already a mechanism of cooperation with Russia is in place, namely the EU-Russia summits, it is at least incomprehensible why this state should be included. Plus, Russia never expressed the will to join the Union and the relations with it have to be built on another level compared to states who want to join the EU.

In conclusion, Eastern Partnership can be successful for the short-time period when it accomplishes the liberalization of visa regime, trade, investments. Afterwards it will stagnate without other incentives for target countries to move forward. There is still time for European chancelleries to think over the Polish-Swedish project and to come up with a genuine and successful Europeanization model of Eastern Neighborhood with a final objective to be the full integration.

Prognosis

Transnistrian resolution process gained a new dimension when Russia started to play a more active role as a mediator and mentor to supervise the reach of a final settlement. However, Russia conditioned the reunification of Moldova to several important clauses which undermine the sovereignty of the state. Nonetheless, with the full support of Moldovan authorities, Russia hopes to acquire the “experience” in conflict resolution which it could apply afterwards to other frozen conflicts in the post-soviet space. This trend will continue with Russia poised to rule out the EU form this region and to ensure on the other hand that NATO is not moving in.

Therefore, Moldova finds itself at the discretion of Russian might with no or little involvement on behalf of the EU. The policy of soft Europeanization carried out by EU is not rendering the expected results and initiatives like the Eastern Partnership do not have a desired finality.

On the internal scene with the electoral race taking amplitude, the stakes will focus on two issues: Transnistrian settlement and European integration. First is monopolized by the party in power and run in tandem with Russia detrimentally to state interests. The second is badly imitated and compromised by the aggressive policy towards Romania, an EU member. That is why the Opposition plays the card of EU integration and closer ties with Romania backing the Small Border Traffic Agreement. Thus, the following months will follow this scenario, with some possible minor adjustments.