The Rise of a New Russia: How Long “Independent Moldova” Can Survive?

The Rise of a New Russia: How Long “Independent Moldova” Can Survive?

Overview

In a postmodern era the system of international relations is being shaken deep down to its foundations by the rise of an old-new actor eager to regain the power lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian Federation, its heir, tries to bring the established international order down to pieces returning to the era of bipolarism and realpolitik.

The events in Georgia, a sovereign state facing two “frozen conflicts” on its territory, the legacy left by the defunct Soviet Union, have triggered a brutal and unconceivable reaction from Russia, who started a full-fledged war against Georgia hiding behind week excuses of protecting Russian citizens in South Osetia. South Osetia, a breakaway region of Georgia who enjoys de facto independence since 1991 and de jure being under Russian control served as motive for Georgian authorities to start military actions after continuous provocations from the unrecognized regime in Tshinval, the capital of South Osetia. Russian Federation retaliated as if Russian territory was attacked leading to an occupation of half Georgian territory, including key points as the town of Gori, military port to the Black Sea, Poti and military base in Senaki, all controlled by Russian troops even now when a six points cease-fire agreement was reached by EU mediation calling for a full withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgia.

The reaction of international community was humble, to say the few. Both the US and the EU condemned Russian aggression in Georgia, but did nothing to stop it. Verbal warnings had no effect portraying a Russia who continued to argue it was a righteous action and the blame belongs to Tbilisi.

The apogees nevertheless, was the Russian recognition of South Osetian and Abkhazian independence, which gives a new dangerous “perspective” over the resolution of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Following these events, Moldova should deeply reconsider its position towards Russia and the instruments used by Moscow in Georgia. While such a scenario has little chances to be repeated in Transnistria, precautionary steps and a new strategy have to be formulated in order to avoid a worsening of the situation in the Transnistrian conflict resolution process.

Moldova’s Non-reaction Equals to Silence of the Lambs

Moldova and Georgia have a lot in common. They have been parts of the Soviet Union and after its disintegration they inherited separatist movements on their newly established territories. Both of them had a common actor to blame for that: Russia. After 2003 when Voronin turned down Kozak Memorandum and announced European integration as priority number one of Moldovan foreign policy, Moldova and Georgia got closer within a new regional organization, GUAM, featuring Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, all united by a sense of opposition to Russian policies in the Commonwealth of Independent States and explicit will to join the European Union.

Unfortunately, since 2005 Voronin and his Communist rule abandoned the allies within GUAM building on a closer and privileged relation with Russia. Heavily betting on the Russian support to find a solution to the Transnistrian conflict, Chisinau got blind to all the other matters in the post-Soviet space. Now, with the Russian-Georgian war unfolded, Moldova remained silent. The only thing to do was a communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration by which Moldova aligned itself to the EU declaration on the matter. No other official declarations on behalf of the Presidency or Parliament have followed. Compared to Ukraine’s president Yushchenko who blamed Russian aggression, closed Ukrainian ports for the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and sent humanitarian aid to Georgia, Voronin was having his vacation in Croatia. In his absence, no other official expressed any position towards the outrageous actions of Russia. Just recently, after the civil society and a group of experts expressed deep concerns about the developments taking place in the region, the Government shamefully released a declaration by which declares that the conflict on Georgia will have no repercussions for Moldova and the resolution of Transnistrian problem. Even more, the Government considers there are good preconditions that will allow the parties to successfully bring the matter to a quick end.

This conviction obviously stems from the visit Voronin paid to Sochi where he met with Russian president Medvedev. Apparently, Medvedev warned Voronin not to repeat Georgian “mistakes” and declared that a peaceful solution can be found if to respect the actual format of negotiations and the commitments Moldova engaged to. Hence, one should think that Voronin pledged not to undertake any military action, which anyway would have been futile given the superior armed forces Tiraspol has at its disposal, but instead promised to stay quiet, follow Moscow’s indications and everyone will be happy. This however means a return to Kozak plan rejected in 2003 by Voronin, if to cite Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, a situation highly unacceptable to official Chisinau. President Voronin was speaking after the meeting with Medvedev that Russia supports Moldovan territorial integrity and will go in accordance with the Moldovan Parliament’s law from 2005. In this context it is difficult to discern where the truth lies. Nevertheless, given the fact Russia feels stronger than ever it will do the things its own way, either peacefully or militarily.

However Moldova’s position is strikingly naïve and optimistic about its “independence” celebrated recently. Notwithstanding the regretful events happening in the Caucasus, Moldova’s authorities still believe Russia will act within the provisions of the international law and will respect Moldova’s territorial integrity, not mentioning the fact it has military forces deployed in Transnistria and no words were mentioned about this at the meeting in Sochi.

Moreover, the quick visit of Romanian president Basescu to Chisinau in the framework of his Black Sea tour to discuss the security matters in the aftermath of Russian aggression in Georgia did not bring the expected results. The experts consider that Basescu acted on the suggestion of EU and the US and had to rally support in order to prevent future possible developments of Russia’s actions in its neighborhood. Most probably Voronin was advised to think over his position towards Russia and not to provoke the authorities in Tiraspol. This comes after Smirnov regime condemned Georgian actions in South Osetia and demanded that Chisinau does the same. Furthermore, Tiraspol interrupted any liaisons with Chisinau until the authorities on the left bank will adopt a clear anti-Georgia position. Following these developments it is hardly conceivable how both Russia and official Chisinau speak about the resolution process in such positive terms. Moreover, after Kremlin recognized South Osetia and Abkhazia independence, Tiraspol expects the same treatment. Voices in the political circles on the right bank declared that same scenario will develop in Tiraspol as well, no matter the official position in Chisinau.

It becomes more and more complicated since only the civil society got alarmed. The authorities continue to put their trust in Russia ignoring the voice of reason. Civil society limited in its actions and with the opposition totally ignored too, the Communists will take full responsibility for everything which might happen.

As in the past, Voronin favors to solve foreign policy issues directly with Russia and not to rely on the West. Now it is high time to question once again the military neutrality of Moldova, the commitments taken towards European partners as well as the allegiances to Moscow. Is Kremlin closer and better than Brussels?

What Comes Next?

In the last weeks Georgia held the frontlines in all major newspapers all over the world. As a side effect, the situation in Moldova was discussed as well depicting different scenarios for Transnistria. These scenarios are closely linked to the future of Ukraine, given the sharp reactions of Yushchenko administration to Russia’s actions in Georgia. The explanation is the demographic structure of Crimea and its strategic importance in the Black Sea for Russia where its fleet is hosted. The majority of the Crimea population is of Russian nationality which holds Russian passports. A possible intention to join Russia and a disintegration of Ukraine, which is taken into consideration by the West as a follow-up to Georgia, could trigger even more dangerous developments in Transnistria.

One scenario would stand for an independent Crimea asking to be included into the Russian Federation. In this case Russia would prefer to link Crimea to Transnistria as a bridge to the Balkans as it always wanted. With disappearance of Ukraine as a state, other territorial claims would be submitted by other neighbors. One would be Romania to claim the northern part of Bucovina and Hertsa region as well as Southern Bessarabia with Ismail and Belgorod regions. Another claimant would be Poland to include all western Ukraine, eastern part leaning to Russia. In this case the solution for the rest of Moldova, favored by the West would be to unite with Romania. This is the most “fantastic” development which the EU and the US should not let happen.

Another scenario is that Russia will impose to Moldova a Kozak II plan given its rise and a policy based on force. With Georgia scenario in mind, Voronin will have to capitulate and accept a federal solution. This will mean a Transnistrization of the whole Moldova, an already ongoing process as a consequence of the submissive policy promoted by Communist party. Hence, Moldova will become a puppet state ruled from Moscow. So far this scenario has the biggest chances to materialize, since the authorities seem not to be worried and ahead of the elections next year they can accept a quick solution to the conflict. If the EU and the US will not intervene in case the situation degenerates in such a way, as they did in 2003, Moldova might be lost.

The third scenario and the most desired one would be the replacement of Russian peacekeeper contingent with a mission of military and civil observers deployed by the EU under the mandate of UN. This should be followed by the total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria and all the stockpiles of ammunition. The negotiation format should exclude Russia as a party to the conflict and to include the EU and the US as mediators. Only this can bring a fair solution to the conflict and preserve territorial integrity of Moldova. This third scenario is totally impossible under the Communist government. If Moldova resists any Russian solution at least till the elections, one can hope that Moldovan electorate will punish the current party and vote for a change. A pro-Western government can advocate the above mentioned scenario which responds to the national interests of the state.

Prognosis

Russian aggression towards Georgia changed the way frozen conflicts are solved on the post-Soviet space. With the unilateral recognition of South Osetia and Abkhazia independence by the Russian Federation, the things will get more precipitated in Transnistria and possibly in Nagorno-Karabakh. The somehow hesitant position of the EU and its internal division leaves Russia with a free hand and the possibility to get away with it. While Germany, Italy, France showed a conciliating attitude, the new EU members called for action against the eastern giant. An emergency EU-Russia summit was scheduled to be held on September 1 approaching the situation in Georgia. Little can spring out of this event if the EU will not push for measures aiming to discipline Russia.

On its side, Moldova and its government have to keep the eyes wide open and not to step into Russia’s trap with regard to Transnistrian settlement. Despite the huge desire to solve the issue before the elections, the Communist party has to think first of all about the long-term national interests of the state and not short-term gains before the electoral cycle. Now since Russia is showing a huge appetite for restoring its complete influence in the “near abroad”, this appetite has to be contained by the EU, as it is the Union who may follow.