Russia’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Moldova: Building on the Momentum for the Interests of “Greater Russia”
Overview
For the first time since 2003 a high Transnistrian official could travel to Europe to spread the word about the wishes of the “Transnistrian people” and its rightful quest for independence. On the other hand Russia is pushing forward a “unique” model of conflict resolution for the post-soviet space which from Moscow’s point of view will end the territorial disputes and will bring peace and prosperity under the kind leadership of Russia.
The visit of the Russian Duma’s speaker to Chisinau could be considered a new step in the scheme designed to make the reunification of Moldova possible under the Russian auspices whatever it may hold. As Communist party led by Voronin is approaching a critical moment to face the elections next year, the goal of reuniting the country appears to be paramount in boosting the party’s popularity. The conditions under which this reunification has to take place are fully disregarded by the current leadership, Voronin submitting entirely Moldova’s future to Russian interests.
However, a new Commission for European Integration has been created by a President decree to witness speaker Marian Lupu left outside alone, while Polish and Swedish governments are backing an “Eastern Partnership” to include the neighboring Eastern countries and develop closer relationships with the EU.
Russia’s Emerging Power of Conflict Resolution
Kosovo precedent made Russia look differently at the frozen conflicts in the post-soviet space and Russian leadership saw a possibility to avenge itself in the relation with the West. That would consist in Russia emerging as a key actor in solving these conflicts to its benefit and at the expense of the other actors concerned, primarily the EU. As such, Moldova is the best opportunity ever to accomplish this far-reaching goal. A successful reunification of Moldova under Russia’s auspices will give it the right to claim first-hand actions on the post-soviet space as well as elsewhere where Russian interests are affected. Since the EU and Russia dispute between themselves the influence in countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, etc this “fight” for spheres of interest becomes fiercer and fiercer. Nonetheless, Russia holds the advantage of having tied these countries to its economy and controlling them through energy supplies which are vital for all of these states.
Why Moldova is fit for serving Russian interests? First of all, through its supportive policy towards Tiraspol, Russia estranged Chisinau and threw it in the arms of the West, who however did not take advantage from it at the right time. Now the situation changed and as Moldova intensified its relations with the EU, Russia became more aware of the fact that it may lose its influence in the region. Moreover, NATO enlargement and the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining it triggered a more active involvement on behalf of Russia towards resolution process in Moldova. Yet, this involvement has its cost which must be paid by Voronin.
The terms for reaching a final political settlement have been made clear by Russia – Moldova has to make its neutrality an internationally recognized matter in such a way cutting any possibility for Moldova to join NATO. Second, the reunification has to ensure and recognize Russian investments in Transnistria illegally carried out together with Tiraspol leadership. Thus, the strategic branches of Moldovan economy will be controlled by Russian business – wine and spirits sector, steel industry, energy sector. Third, Russia insists on a fair representation of Transnistria in the future political institutions of the reunited state. It would not matter the formula used for the new state – unitary, federation or anything else if Transnistrian politicians gained access to key positions in the government. The political analysts even coined a term for this “grand project” – Transnistrization. In some way, this is exactly what will happen if the settlement is to follow the Russian plan.
The application of this ostentatious project has actually already begun. First, Voronin met with Smirnov and it was made possible only by Russian interference. Furthermore, negotiations in the “5+2” format are strongly backed to be resumed and Russia is exerting pressure on Tiraspol to come back to the negotiations table. Third, Russia undertakes steps on strengthening the link with Moldovan parliament, as the most constitutionally important institution of the country and which will have to play a key role in the event of reunification. Thus, Mironov, the Russian speaker visited Chisinau and Comrat and publicly avoided to pay a visit to Tiraspol. This is a sign for Smirnov that he has to go into concessions with Chisinau - otherwise Moscow’s support will seize to exist for him.
Accordingly, Voronin has to pay back what Russia does for him. The new Concept of National Security has been adopted against the fierce disagreement of the Opposition. This new concept fails to account for Moldova’s interests and actually puts at risk its security with the Russian troops still present on its territory. Furthermore, Voronin voiced the intention of possibly leaving GUAM as an anti-Russian organization. Also the relations with Bucharest are worsening again, fed by disagreements over Border Agreement, etc. In such a way, Moldova finds itself at Russian mercy which will not hesitate to take full advantage of it. The only hope is that the Opposition from Parliament, civil society as well as the EU will take a more active stance to preclude Communists from making Moldova a gift to Moscow and resuscitate the dream of a “Greater Russia”. With such a growing appetite, there is not too far the time when not Moldova will be at stake. That is why these “expansionist” ambitions and search for power have to be tempered now when it is not too late, while Moldova shall become a reintegrated state under the auspices of the international community, in accordance with the international law and the will expressed by its people.
The Nature of the Beast: Economic Prowess – Political Clumsiness
Since its inception the European Union, the then three European Communities wanted itself to be no more than an economic organization in order to rebuild Europe after the devastation of the Second World War as well as to put an end to the Franco-German hostility. As such it never was meant to go beyond this boundary and to merge into a political entity as to have “a Europe speaking with a single voice”. Undoubtedly, the progress made over decades deserves to be called a good try. Yet, Europe is as far from being a heavy political actor as it was 50 years ago. Hence, the best quotation for this “ambitious integration project” remains to be “EU – an economic giant and a political dwarf”.
Apart from all the examples in the past to illustrate this postulate like the Balkan wars, disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the war in Iraq, the most recent would be Moldova. Why so? Moldova never was of interest to EU. However, the situation changed when the enlargement wave included Romania and the “black hole of Europe” became a problem to worry about. Secessionist region of Transnistria was no longer a concern only for Moldova. Nonetheless, the other major threat springing from the poorest country in Europe was the illegal migration which EU is unable to fight efficiently. As a result, Moldova found itself between “two fires” – Moscow and Brussels.
While economic attractiveness of EU has no match, Moldova is tied up historically to the Russian market, plus a heavy political influence exerted by Russian government over Moldovan political class. Given the frozen conflict which both objectively and subjectively hinders the development of the country, the battle over Moldova would be won by the one who manages to solve the conflict. Still, this is the simplest way of looking at things, in reality the situation being a lot more complex.
As mentioned above, Russia is developing a model of conflict resolution and Moldova is the experimental ground for it. On the other hand EU has its own model of conflict resolution – the Europeanization understood in terms of conditionality and socialization into European norms and values with a gradual integration with EU structures at a certain level the highest one being the actual joining of the Union. In this case Moldova could also be an experimental ground for EU to test its ability as a political actor and conflict resolution.
Accordingly, several steps have been made. One of them was the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. The Mission renders good results, however no weaponry or big quantity of drugs have been discovered as it was expected at the beginning. In the same vein, the Mission is one of assistance and advisory with a limited mandate and no political power. The possibility for a Mission of Military and Civil Observers with an international mandate sent under the auspices of EU in tandem with UN in Transnistria to replace the Russian “peacekeepers” went unanswered. Maximum what EU was ready to do is to accept the observer status within the negotiation format “5+2” and earlier in 2005 to appoint a Special Representative for Moldova. Frankly speaking, all these initiatives proved futile and of little impact. None of these could counter Russian power in the region and as in the past Moscow gains more and more ground.
The recent trip of Transnistrian speaker to Europe was a breakthrough, but not for the conflict resolution process, but for Transnistria’s fight against isolation. All Sevciuk did was to let Europe know about the desire for independence of Transnistrian people. Any agreement for political settlement with Chisinau has to respect that will. The other meetings Sevciuk had in Brussels with EU officials and Moldovan speaker Lupu also rendered few results. Until the parties do not sit at the negotiations table to reach an agreement the situation will go unchanged. And that is specifically what Russia is trying to do – to bring the parties to speak to each other, but following the directives from Moscow. In this scenario the losers are Chisinau and Brussels. While this can have a small impact on EU now, in the long run the Union will have to face directly Russian strength along the whole eastern border. Instead Moldova will seize to exist as an independent and sovereign state, which it never actually was. A reunified Moldova under Russian guidelines will be a puppet state entirely controlled from Moscow. To wait until the 2009 elections can prove to be somewhat late. If the EU is to do something and disprove its fame of a political dwarf, it has to do it here and now.
Eastern Partnership: A New Tool to Keep Away Undesirables?
Recently the Polish and Swedish governments have come up with a new initiative to improve the effectiveness of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). That is to be called the Eastern Partnership (EP) and will include Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the possible inclusion of Belarus and Russia. The initiative in itself bears nothing new, as it replicates to some extent the Mediterranean Partnership. The declarative goals of this undertaking are a visa-free regime, free trade area, enhanced political ties. All in all, a beneficial policy for all the partners involved – EU-27 and target countries.
Nevertheless, the EP will not have a separate secretariat and will be administered directly by the Commission. Moreover, there is still lacking a full support among the member states for the initiative to be launched. And at the end of the day, the project lacks its finality. What should this EP accomplish? Membership to the EU is off the agenda for all target countries, no mentioning of an associate status either. It seems that the EP has finality just for EU – to keep away the undesirables. On the one hand it is clear that absorption capacity of EU decreased after encompassing ten new states during 2004-2007, following in the near future another wave of enlargement to bring in the Western Balkans. Yet, a clear-cut prospective for the eastern neighbors will only enhance their willingness to change and internalize European norms and values.
Poland always backed Ukrainian interests within EU advocating for its inclusion. Same policy it displays towards Moldova. To a certain degree the new members will possibly support a European future for Moldova and Ukraine. What is unclear is the behavior of old members who are the biggest contributors to EU budget. Most likely a more distant approach would be the answer. Another drawback of the EP is its extension to Russia. Given the tacit war between the EU and Russia for control in this buffer zone, the latter will do anything to prevent Moldova and Ukraine as well as Georgia from developing closer ties with the EU. As long as there already a mechanism of cooperation with Russia is in place, namely the EU-Russia summits, it is at least incomprehensible why this state should be included. Plus, Russia never expressed the will to join the Union and the relations with it have to be built on another level compared to states who want to join the EU.
In conclusion, Eastern Partnership can be successful for the short-time period when it accomplishes the liberalization of visa regime, trade, investments. Afterwards it will stagnate without other incentives for target countries to move forward. There is still time for European chancelleries to think over the Polish-Swedish project and to come up with a genuine and successful Europeanization model of Eastern Neighborhood with a final objective to be the full integration.
Prognosis
Transnistrian resolution process gained a new dimension when Russia started to play a more active role as a mediator and mentor to supervise the reach of a final settlement. However, Russia conditioned the reunification of Moldova to several important clauses which undermine the sovereignty of the state. Nonetheless, with the full support of Moldovan authorities, Russia hopes to acquire the “experience” in conflict resolution which it could apply afterwards to other frozen conflicts in the post-soviet space. This trend will continue with Russia poised to rule out the EU form this region and to ensure on the other hand that NATO is not moving in.
Therefore, Moldova finds itself at the discretion of Russian might with no or little involvement on behalf of the EU. The policy of soft Europeanization carried out by EU is not rendering the expected results and initiatives like the Eastern Partnership do not have a desired finality.
On the internal scene with the electoral race taking amplitude, the stakes will focus on two issues: Transnistrian settlement and European integration. First is monopolized by the party in power and run in tandem with Russia detrimentally to state interests. The second is badly imitated and compromised by the aggressive policy towards Romania, an EU member. That is why the Opposition plays the card of EU integration and closer ties with Romania backing the Small Border Traffic Agreement. Thus, the following months will follow this scenario, with some possible minor adjustments.
